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AMERICAN NEEDLE AND THE APPLICATION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT TO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS LEAGUES
GREGORY J. WERDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the National Football League's ("NFL") teams formed
National Football League Properties ("NFLP"), ajoint venture that
has licensed their intellectual property for use on merchandise.'
Each team gave NFLP the exclusive right to license its trademarks
and logos for use on merchandise. 2 After decades of non-exclusive
* Senior Economic Counsel, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of justice.
The views expressed herein are not purported to reflect those of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice.
1. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010)
(asserting, "[p]rior to 1963, the teams made their own arrangements for licensing
their intellectual property and marketing trademarked items such as caps and jer-
seys."). The record before the Court, however, contains no support for that asser-
tion; at oral argument, Justice Sotomayor asked counsel for the NFL whether
intellectual property ever had been licensed "by the individual teams," and counsel
responded: "It was done, I believe collectively, through Roy Rogers Enterprises."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661), availa-
ble at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-
661.pdf. During the four years prior to the formation of NFLP, Roy Rogers Enter-
prises licensed merchandise for all NFL teams. See MICHAEL ORIARD, BRAND NFL:
MAKING AND SELLING AMERICA'S FAVORITE SPORT 3 (Univ. of N. Carolina Press
2007) (relating role of Roy Rodgers Enterprises in licensing NFL merchandise).
The first president of NFLP was Larry Kent, who had been manager of the market-
ing at Roy Rogers Enterprises. See Neil Steinberg, He Could Always Move Merchan-
dise, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 27, 1998, available at http://images.si.com/vault/
article/magazine/MAG1013413/index.htm (noting tenure of Larry Kent's NFLP
presidency from 1962 to 1971). Public sources consulted by the author reveal no
merchandise licensing by an NFL team before 1959.
2. See Joint Appendix at 350-58, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League,
No. 08-661, 2009 WL 3006320 (Sept. 18, 2009) [Hereinafter Joint Appendix 1]
(discussing Trust Agreement wherein teams formally pooled their intellectual
property in NFL Trust in 1982); see alsoJoint Appendix at 387, Am. Needle, Inc. v.
Nat'l Football League (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3022168 (Sep. 18, 2009) [Hereinaf-
terjoint Appendix 2] (highlighting exclusive licensing provision in License Agree-
ment). See Brief for Petitioner, Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat'l Football
League Trust (No. 95- 9426), 1996 WL 34473933 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 11, 1996)
(stating "in 1982, the NFL created the aptly-named 'NFL Trust' to control the
licensing of the marks of the NFL's member clubs."). SeeJoint Appendix 2, supra
at 464 (noting that Dolphins and Raiders did not sign Trust Agreement but
granted rights directly to NFLP); Joint Appendix 1, supra at 238, 247-48 (detailing
NFL Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts in Support
of Its Response to Motion of NFL Defendants for Summary Judgment (Single En-
tity) and asserting all but two NFL Clubs entered into the 1982 Trust Agreement).
(395)
1
Werden: American Needle and the Application of the Sherman Act to Profess
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
396 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
licensing, NFLP granted Reebok a ten-year exclusive license for use
on apparel.3 Hat manufacturer American Needle, Inc. ("ANI"), a
long-time NFLP licensee, brought suit, alleging that the NFL and its
teams unlawfully acted in concert in granting the Reebok license.4
ANI based its claim on section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
"reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy between separate entities."5 The
NFL moved for summary judgment, arguing the League and its
teams acted as a single economic entity and therefore could not be
liable.6 The lower courts credited the NFL's single-entity argument,
but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed.7 Although the
Court did not preclude single-entity treatment for a joint venture
under every possible circumstance, the Court apparently did fore-
close single-entity treatment for any significant action by a major
professional sports league.8
II. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN NEEDLE
The Supreme Court's analysis initially notes the Sherman Act's
"basic distinction ... between concerted and independent action,"
explaining Congress "treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior" because concerted action "deprives the market-
place of independent centers of decisionmaking that competition
assumes and demands."9
On the question of what is, and is not, concerted action, the
Court observes its prior decisions "eschewed . . . formalistic distinc-
tions in favor of a functional consideration of how the parties in-
3. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207 (noting in December 2000, "[NFLP]
granted Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive 10-year license to manufacture
and sell trademarked headwear for all 32 teams.").
4. See id. (discussing ANI filing suit in Northern District of Illinois regarding
agreements between NFL, NFL teams, NFLP and Reebok).
5. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (inter-
nal quotations omitted). See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208 (reiterating "section 1
applies only to concerted action that restrains trade").
6. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207 (relating "single entity" theory as basis for
motion for summary judgment).
7. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, 496 F.Supp.2d 941,
944 (N.D. Ill. 2007), affd sub nom, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538
F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding in favor of NFL that member teams consti-
tute single entity exempt from section 1 rule of Sherman Antitrust Act); Am. Needle,
130 S. Ct. at 2217 (reversing lower court decisions by holding NFL is not single
entity for antitrust purposes).
8. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (refuting "single entity" theory regarding
marketing of "the teams' individually owned intellectual property").
9. Id at 2208-09 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-69).
[Vol. 18: p. 395
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volved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate."' 0
The Court notes that it previously found concerted action, even
though a single legal entity was involved, when "the entity was con-
trolled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehi-
cle for ongoing concerted activity."" To illustrate, the Court cites
cases involving professional organizations and trade groups, as well
the trademark licensing joint venture at issue in the Sealy case.' 2
The Court also discusses that it found concerted action to be ab-
sent, even though multiple legal entities were involved.' 3 To ex-
plain, the Court traces the decline of the "intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine," culminating in the Copperweld decision, which
held a corporation is legally incapable of conspiring with a wholly
owned, but separately incorporated, subsidiary.14
Building on this foundation, the Court explains that in deter-
mining whether conduct is concerted, the "key is whether the al-
leged contract, combination . . . or conspiracy . . . joins together
separate decisionmakers . . . pursuing separate economic inter-
ests."' 5 Applying this insight, the Court finds collective licensing by
the NFL teams is concerted conduct.16 The Court observes that
each team "is a substantial, independently owned, and indepen-
dently managed business" and that "the teams compete in the mar-
ket for intellectual property."' 7 The Court also declares, in
licensing intellectual property, the teams acted as "separate eco-
nomic actors pursuing separate economic interests," and conse-
quently, the decision to license collectively and the decision to
license Reebok exclusively, "depriv[ed] the marketplace of inde-
pendent sources of decisionmaking."' 8
The Court separately addresses the actions of NFLP, noting
that "it is not dispositive that the teams have organized and own a
10. See id. (discussing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967)).
11. Id.
12. See id. (detailing issues in Sealy).
13. See id. at 2209 (highlighting strict Congressional treatment of concerted
behavior as compared to unilateral behavior and parties as legally distinct entities
is not dispositive of concerted action under section 1).
14. See id. at 2210-11 (noting intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine "treated co-
operation between legally separate entities as necessarily covered by § 1" but CoP-
perweld held this doctrine inconsistent with organizational distinctions).
15. Id. at 2212 (internal quotations omitted).
16. See id. at 2215 (finding concerted action because "[t]hirty -two teams op-
erating independently through the vehicle of the NFLP are not like the compo-
nents of a single firm that act to maximize the firm's profits").
17. Id. at 2212-13.
18. Id. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 769 (1984)).
2011] 397
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legally separate entity that centralizes the management of their in-
tellectual property" but "[t]he question whether NFLP decisions
can constitute concerted activity covered by § 1 is closer than
whether decisions made directly by the thirty-two teams are covered
by § 1."19 The Court observes:
We generally treat agreements within a single firm as inde-
pendent action on the presumption that the components
of the firm will act to maximize the firm's profits. But in
rare cases, that presumption does not hold. Agreements
made within a firm can constitute concerted action cov-
ered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act on inter-
ests separate from those of the firm itself . . . .20
The Court ultimately holds "decisions by the NFLP regarding
the teams' separately owned intellectual property constitute con-
certed action" because the teams have "economic interests that are
distinct from NFLP's financial well-being;" therefore, the teams "are
not like components of a single firm that act to maximize the firm's
profits."2 ' Rather, the Court declares: "The 32 teams capture indi-
vidual economic benefits separate and apart from NFLP profits as a
result of the decisions they make for the NFLP."22 The Court con-
cludes: "In making the relevant licensing decisions, NFLP is there-
fore 'an instrumentality' of the teams," noting that a per se
unlawful cartel could be formed through a marketing joint venture
acting as an instrumentality for a group of competitors. 23
19. Id. at 2213-14.
20. Id. at 2215.
21. Id. The Court contrasts the NFL teams' involvement with NFLP to "typical
decisions by corporate shareholders" on the basis that "NFLP's licensing decisions
effectively require the assent of more than a mere majority . . . ." Id. But no such
finding was made in the case, and NFLP's articles of incorporation are silent on
the matter. SeeJoint Appendix 1, supra note 2, at 311-16 (discussing corporate
structure). The Court also comments that "each team's decision reflects not only
an interest in NFLP's profits but also an interest in the team's individual profits."
Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215. The two interests need not diverge; a public com-
pany's shareholders vote in accord with their individual interests need not align
perfectly with those of the company. See id. (analyzing corporate shareholder anal-
ogy). Finally, the Court observes: "The 32 teams capture individual economic
benefits separate and apart from NFLP profits as a result of the decisions they
make for the NFLP. NFLP's decisions thus affect each team's profits from licens-
ing its own intellectual property." Id. This would have been true if individual
teams did their own merchandise licensing, but independent licensing had been
prohibited by contract. SeeJoint Appendix 2, supra note 2, at 387 (noting exclusive
licensing provision in License Agreement).
22. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215.
23. Id. at 2215-16 (quoting United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353
(1967)).
[Vol. 18: p. 395
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III. AMERICAN NEEDLE ON REMAND
ANI based its damages claim on section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which entitles "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to
recover treble damages.24 The "by reason of' proviso is an impor-
tant limitation; ANI must show "injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the
defendants' acts unlawful."25 The NFL is apt to move for summary
judgment on the grounds that ANI cannot make the requisite
showing.26
ANI was injured by the denial of a license, resulting in lost
profit it would have earned from selling hats with NFL team logos. 2 7
Consumers plausibly were also injured as they likely paid higher
prices for NFL team hats and selected from a reduced variety as a
consequence of Reebok's exclusive license.28 Given the Supreme
Court's decision, collective licensing by the NFL teams plausibly vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act by eliminating licensing compe-
tition among the teams; nevertheless, ANI could have great
difficulty defeating the NFL's summary judgment motion.29
Although the injury to consumers in this case was "injury of a
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent," it is not clear that
the injury "flow[ed] from that which [made] the defendants' acts
unlawful."30 Consumer injury was caused by the elimination of
competition among makers of hats, not by the elimination of com-
petition among the NFL teams in licensing their trademarks and
logos; consumers would have suffered the same injury if Reebok
obtained an exclusive license from each individual team.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2010).
25. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
26. The NFL has been granted summary judgment on a comparable basis in
prior cases. See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football
League, 154 F.3d 851, 862-65 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for
failure to present evidence indicating "the NFL's anticompetitive acts were an ac-
tual, material cause of the alleged harm to competition"); Murray v. Nat'l Football
League, No.94-5971, 1998 WL 205596, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (granting sum-
mary judgment on basis that there was no causal connection between challenged
action by NFL and injury complained).
27. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207 (relating non-renewal of ANI's nonexclu-
sive license).
28. See id. at 2209 (discussing harmful effects of anticompetitive behavior on
market).
29. See id. at 2215 (stating NFLP decisions regarding teams' individual intel-
lectual property constitutes concerted action not beyond scope of section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
30. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 477.
2011] 399
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More importantly, the injury to ANI appears not to "flow from
that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful."31 Consumers of
NFL team hats presumably would have suffered the same injury if
ANI had been awarded an exclusive license for hats rather than
Reebok, yet ANI would not have been injured. Hence, ANI's injury
was neither necessary to produce the injury to consumers, nor was
it a consequence of that injury. Furthermore, ANI could not have
suffered injury from elimination of licensing competition among
the teams. ANI sought to license the intellectual property of all of
the teams, as its business model was to produce hats for every
team.3 2 Therefore ANI could not have played one team off against
another team in licensing negotiations.
If the case survives to trial, ANI will face significant proof
problems. Most importantly, ANI must prove a relevant market
consisting of NFL team trademarks and logos; this entails proving
both that other trademarks and logos (including those from other
sports leagues) are not good substitutes for those of the NFL teams,
and that the trademarks and logos of individual NFL teams are
good substitutes for each other.3 3 The former proposition is dubi-
ous, and some jurors are apt to find the latter proposition prepos-
terous, as they would tend to agree with Justice Breyer, a long-time
Boston resident, who remarked at oral argument: "I don't know a
Red Sox fan who would take a Yankees sweatshirt if you gave it
away."34
IV. THE SCOPE FOR SINGLE-ENTIry TREATMENT WITH
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
American Needle does not adopt a general test for determining
when a joint venture acts as a single economic entity, but the deci-
sion's analysis of NFLP is suggestive. The Supreme Court focuses
on whether the participants in the venture "act on interests sepa-
rate from those of the [venture]" and consequently do not act "to
maximize the [the venture's] profits."35 With that focus, some joint
ventures would be treated as single economic entities.
31. Id.
32. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207 (noting that prior to 2000, ANI was recip-
ient of non-exclusive license from NFLP "to manufacture and sell apparel bearing
team insignias.").
33. See id. at 2213 (acknowledging existence of market competition between
NFL teams regarding intellectual property).
34. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 16.
35. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2215.
[Vol. 18: p. 395
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American Needle suggests that a joint venture is treated as a sin-
gle economic entity when its participants have no material interests
outside the venture.36 Such joint ventures could be uncommon,
but examples include some professional services partnerships. If
the partnership agreement prohibits outside practice, the reason-
ing of American Needle suggests that the partners do not engage in
concerted action when they set a schedule of fees for the firm: They
must be maximizing the partnership's profits because they have no
outside professional interests that could be advanced by the fee
schedule.
American Needle also suggests that a joint venture is treated as a
single economic entity when its participants can be expected to
maximize the venture's profits rather than act on interests they
have outside the venture. 7 That expectation is reasonable if ajoint
venture is set up and operated as an ordinary profit-maximizing
business, and if all outside interests of the participants are not
closely related to the business of the venture.38 An example from
antitrust history is Penn-Olin Chemical Co., formed in 1960 by
Pennsalt Chemicals Corp. and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.39
Penn-Olin was organized as a stock company with each owner con-
tributing half the capital and holding half of the stock. 40 Neither
parent competed in the relevant market, nor had an outside inter-
est directly affected by the venture; Penn-Olin apparently operated
as an ordinary profit-maximizing business.41 The same is likely true
36. See id. (suggesting circumstances under which joint ventures may be single
entities).
37. See id. at 2214-15 (articulating certain aspects of relationship between par-
ticipants in joint venture).
38. Input supply ventures formed by competitors are particularly unlikely to
operate as profit-maximizing companies because the participants' actions are apt
to be driven by their interests downstream. Ajoint venture formed by merging the
captive supply operations of several competitors could be operated so as to restrict
the aggregate output in the downstream market and thereby force up prices. Al-
ternatively, the venture could be operated to increase the downstream marginal
costs of production and thereby induce higher downstream prices. That could be
done by setting the price for the input well above competitive levels and paying out
the joint venture's profits in fixed ownership shares. For a discussion of these
possibilities, see GregoryJ. Werden, Antitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures: An Overview,
66 ANrrrRUsT L.J. 701, 723-24 nn.89-93 (1998).
39. See generally United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 163
(1964) (providing useful summary of history of anti-trust law).
40. See id. at 163 (discussing fundamental points in antitrust law).
41. See id. at 170 (viewing venture as "a new competitive force" in relevant
market). Olin Mathieson had never produced sodium chlorate; Pennsalt pro-
duced sodium chlorate but only far outside the relevant geographic market. See id
at 161-64 (explaining prior history of production of sodium chlorate by compa-
nies). The Court's analysis of the potential competition issue presented by the
case assumed "that neither [parent] will compete with the progeny in its line of
2011] 401
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for companies such as Dow Corning, Sony Ericsson, and Verizon
Wireless. Each is organized as a joint venture, yet presumably each
operates as ordinary profit-maximizing company.42
American Needle does not articulate a test for when a joint ven-
ture acts as a single economic entity, but the Solicitor General did
so in briefing the case.43 Consistent with the Sherman Act princi-
ples articulated in the decision, she argued that a sports league acts
as a single economic entity if, and only if, two conditions are met:
First, the teams and the league must have effectively
merged the relevant aspect of their operations, thereby
eliminating actual and potential competition among the
teams and between the teams and the league in that oper-
ational sphere. Second, the challenged restraint must not
significantly affect actual or potential competition among
the teams or between the teams and the league outside
their merged operations.4 4
American Needle recites these conditions but finds "no need to pass
upon the Government's position that entities are incapable of con-
spiring under § 1" if, and only if, these conditions are met.4 5 The
Court declares that the case involves "agreements amongst poten-
tial competitors and would constitute concerted action under the
Government's own standard" because "the teams could decide to
license their own trademarks." 4 6 The Court also indicates that test
commerce" and that the progeny will not go "into competition with the parents."
Id. at 169.
42. See About Dow Corning, Dow CORNING, http://www.dowcorning.com/con-
tent/about/default.aspx?WT.sl=1&bhcp=1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (showing
Dow Corning is joint venture of The Dow Chemical Co. and Corning, Inc.); Mis-
sion: Welcome to Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications, SONY ERIcssoN MOBILE COMM.,
http://www.sonyericsson.com/cws/companyandpress/aboutus/mission?cc=gb&lc
=en (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (showing Sony Ericsson is joint venture of Sony
Corp. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson); About Us: Facts-at-a-Glance, VERIZON
WIRELESS, http://aboutus.vzw.com/ataglance.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2011)
(showing Verizon Wireless is name under which business is conducted by Cellco
Partnership, which is joint venture of Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodafone
Group Plc.).
43. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
17, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661) (constructing two
part test for Court to use in deciding case).
44. Id. (discussing Court's application of test).
45. Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2216 n.9 (2010) (discussing importance of
teams maintaining control of NFL Players Association).
46. Id. This assertion is difficult to rationalize with documents relating to the
NFL's intellectual property licensing. SeeJoint Appendix 1, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing NFL's intellectual property licensing agreements). Amending or dissolving the
NFL Trust Agreement requires consent of three-quarters of the participating
[Vol. 18: p. 395
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was not satisfied because the NFL teams, which have "potentially
competing interests," were ultimately responsible for the decisions
of NFLP.4 7
When participants in joint ventures defend a claim brought
under section 1 of the Sherman Act on the basis that the venture
and its participants should be treated as a single economic entity, a
court could ask, as American Needle suggests, whether the partici-
pants "act on interests separate from those" of the venture.48 Alter-
natively, a court could pose the questions framed by the Solicitor
General. A court could ask whether the joint venture's participants
had "effectively merged the relevant aspect of their operations,
thereby eliminating actual and potential competition" in the rele-
vant market. If so, a court could ask whether the particular actions
at issue nevertheless "significantly affect actual or potential compe-
tition among" the participants in some related market. These ques-
tions plot a course to the particular destination implied by the
Supreme Court in American Needle.
A professional sports league entirely owned and operated by a
single person undoubtedly would be treated as a single economic
entity, even though the teams compete on the field of play, and
even though the teams have separate identities and fan loyalties.
But all major professional sports leagues have independently owned
and operated teams, and American Needle instructs lower courts to
reject single-entity treatment for such a league because the teams
have independent economic interests. American Needle is unclear,
however, on one important point-whether a court should treat a
league pooling all of the teams' revenues and costs as single eco-
nomic entity or as a cartel. By stressing the potential for competi-
tion, American Needle suggests treatment as a cartel, but by focusing
on incentives to maximize league profits, the decision suggests sin-
gle-entity treatment.49
teams. See Joint Appendix 2, supra note 2, at 360 (discussing Trust Agreement
§§ 6.01-.02).
47. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216 n.9 (describing how NFL teams did not
satisfy test).
48. See id. at 2215 (providing example of one course of action courts could
take when participants in joint venture defend claims brought under section 1 of
Sherman Act on basis that participants should be treated as one economic entity).
49. See id. at 2215-16 (discussing treatment as cartels).
2011] 403
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V. ANTITRUST AND THE CORE Ac-rvnTy OF MAJOR
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
Suppose that Congress removes the antitrust exemption long
enjoyed by Major League Baseball ("MLB") which then decides to
avoid freezing temperatures, returning to the 154-game schedule
after four decades with a 162-game schedule.50 Disgruntled fans
file a Sherman Act suit and move for summary judgment, citing
Supreme Court precedent indicating that an output reduction es-
tablishes a rule of reason violation for an agreement among com-
petitors on how they compete, or at least that it does so absent a
pro-competitive justification. 51
MLB could counter with its own summary judgment motion,
arguing that it acts as a single economic entity in scheduling games.
A court, however, almost certainly would hold that American Needle
forecloses this argument, citing the final section of the opinion:
The fact that . . . teams share an interest in making the
entire league successful and profitable, and that they must
cooperate in the production and scheduling of games,
provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host
of collective decisions. But the conduct at issue in this
case is still concerted activity under the Sherman Act that
is subject to § 1 analysis.52
MLB would do better to rest its motion on a somewhat differ-
ent argument premised on the Supreme Court's decision in
50. Judicial fiat exempted the "business of baseball" from the antitrust laws.
See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (illustrating concept of judicial
exemption); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (holding simi-
larly); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'I League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922) (showing judicial fiat). The exemption no longer extends to dis-
putes between the players and the league. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-
297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 26b) (showing cut-off between
players and league). Dealings between players unions and team owners, however,
fall within the non-statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (discussing dealings between players and
teams owners); Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing differences
of specific type of negotiations).
51. See FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) ("proof of
actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output, can obviate" other aspects
of rule of reason inquiry). See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770-71
(1999) ("the burden of procompetitive justification" is placed on those restraining
trade when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect"); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) (a
"naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even
in the absence of a detailed market analysis").
52. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216.
[Vol. 18: p. 395
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Dagher.5 3 The backdrop for that decision was the formation by
Shell and Texaco of ventures "ending competition between the two
companies in the domestic refining and marketing of gasoline."54
A class action lawsuit alleged that the western venture, Equilon En-
terprises, engaged in price fixing, a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, when it adopted the policy of equalizing the
prices of Shell and Texaco gasoline.55 The Ninth Circuit reversed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding
that adopting the policy might be per se unlawful price fixing.56
Invoking the ancillary restraints doctrine, that Court held that the
conduct was per se illegal price fixing unless "reasonably necessary
to further the legitimate aims of the joint venture" and that sum-
mary judgment was wrongly granted because the defendants "failed
to offer any explanation of how their unified pricing of the distinct
Texaco and Shell brands of gasoline served to further the ventures'
legitimate efforts to produce better products or capitalize on
efficiencies."5 7
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the ancillary re-
straints doctrine "governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a
legitimate business collaboration, such as a business association or
joint venture, on nonventure activities" but the doctrine "has no
application" when "the business practice being challenged involves
the core activity of the joint venture itself."58 Seven justices joined
53. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (holding it is not per se ille-
gal under section 1 of Sherman Act for lawful, economically integrated joint ven-
ture to set prices at which products will be sold).
54. Id. at 4.
55. See id. (stating why Ninth Circuit chose to adopt policy).
56. See Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)
(stating court's holding), rev'd, Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
57. Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1121-22. See generally GregoryJ. Werden, The Ancillary
Restraints Doctrine after Dagher, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 17 (2007) (explaining use of and
application of ancillary restraints doctrine). The court found the record "close to
establishing that the price-fixing scheme was sufficiently unrelated to accomplish-
ing the legitimate objectives of the joint venture as tojustify granting the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment" but concluded that denying both sides' summary
judgment motions was proper under the circumstances. Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1122
n.16.
58. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7 (2006). Dagher's rationale for declining to apply the
ancillary restraints doctrine has been understood by one court and many commen-
tators to be based on the Court's view that Equilon acted as a single economic
entity in setting prices. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1012 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("In the Supreme Court's recent Dagher decision, the Court
also clarified that ... an economically-integrated joint venture amounts to a single
entity. . . ."); Herbert Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in
Antitrust Law (Aug. 15 (2010)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1616
625 ("Once [Equilon] was found to be lawfully created, the legality of its prices was
not a matter of conspiracy law."); Jeffrey L. Kessler et. al., The Supreme Court's Deci-
2011] 405
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in the unanimous opinions in both Dagher and American Needle, in-
cluding both authors, so no judge would read American Needle to
undermine anything in Dagher. Thus, ajudge considering the cross
motions for summary judgment might agree with MLB's contention
that it need not explain the necessity of particular choices relating
to core activities such as scheduling games.
If MLB's motion is denied, the fans' motion might be granted.
In opposing the fans' motion, MLB could argue that American Needle
mandates deference to its scheduling decisions, citing the Court's
comment that restraints on competition necessary for the league to
operate are "likely to survive the Rule of Reason" and that its appli-
cation "may not require a detailed analysis."59 A judge, however,
might see no basis in that comment for denying the fans' motion in
view of MLB's inability to explain why its scheduling decision "stim-
ulate[s] competition" or is in "the consumer's best interest," which
are the touchstones in the Court's most recent articulation of the
rule of reason.60
VI. CONCLUSION
American Needle held that the NFL's intellectual property licens-
ing was concerted conduct and suggested that essentially all activi-
ties of the major professional sports leagues also entail concerted
conduct.6' The NFL's hopes of torpedoing future antitrust suits
have been dashed, but the Supreme Court did not change the law
nor clarify it significantly.
sion in Dagher Canary in a Coal Mine or Antitrust Business as Usual?, ANTITRUST, Fall
2006, at 44, 49 ("The Court's statement in Dagher that 'though Equilon's pricing
policy may be price fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust
sense,' is thus nothing more than a restatement of the truism that pricing by a
'single firm' does not restrain competition.") (footnote omitted); James A. Keyte,
Dagher and "Inside" Joint Venture Restraints, ANTRUST, Summer 2006, at 40, 44
("much of the Dagher Court's analysis stemmed from its conclusion that a legiti-
mate joint venture should be viewed in the law as a 'single entity'" allowing Dagher
could now be reinterpreted).
59. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216-17
(2010). "The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice
restrains trade in violation of § 1. . . . In its design and function the rule distin-
guishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the con-
sumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best
interest." Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86
(2007). The Court also observes that "'the interest in maintaining competitive
balance' . . . may well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the teams."
Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
60. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 885-86.
61. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (describing final holding of Court).
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/3
